The Tigray War that consumed northern Ethiopia between 2020 and 2022 was, by the measures that humanitarian organizations use to assess catastrophe, one of the worst conflicts of the early twenty-first century. Hundreds of thousands dead from violence, disease, and starvation. Millions displaced. A systematic campaign of sexual violence used as a weapon of war. Infrastructure deliberately destroyed. And yet, for most of that period, international attention was directed elsewhere, and the mechanisms of international response that had been mobilized for conflicts in other parts of the world did not engage at comparable scale. The Pretoria Agreement that ended the fighting was signed in November 2022 and has held, more or less, since then. The more-or-less qualifier is not incidental. Disarmament has been partial. Accountability for atrocities has been limited; the joint investigation mechanisms envisioned in the agreement have made slow progress. The political grievances that the TPLF, the Tigray People's Liberation Front, brought to the conflict have not been resolved, merely paused. And the humanitarian situation in Tigray, while improved from its worst, remains severe. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who came to power in 2018 as a reformer and won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for his peace agreement with Eritrea, has presided over a country that has lurched from promise to catastrophe and back to a fragile stability that feels like a pause rather than a resolution. His political project, Ethiopianism as an overarching national identity over ethnic federalism, has generated resistance from the ethnic federal structure built by the previous government, which had distributed power along ethnic lines in ways that created regions with distinct identities and, when challenged, distinct grievances. The Oromo insurgency in the west and southwest, which predated the Tigray war and continued through it, has not been resolved. The Amhara militias that fought alongside federal forces in Tigray were subsequently disarmed in a government campaign that generated significant violence. The border between Amhara and Tigray regions remains disputed. Ethiopia's economic situation adds pressure. The country entered a debt restructuring process in 2023, making it one of several low-income countries navigating the debt sustainability problems that accumulated during a period of significant external borrowing. The birr has depreciated substantially. Inflation has been elevated. Foreign exchange constraints have created shortages that affect businesses and households across the economy. And yet. Ethiopia remains, by sub-Saharan African standards, a large and economically significant country. Addis Ababa has developed a service economy, a light manufacturing sector, and a diplomatic infrastructure, the African Union is headquartered there, that gives it influence beyond what its per-capita income would suggest. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile, a source of diplomatic tension with Egypt and Sudan, is also a source of genuine hydropower that has expanded electricity access in a country where energy poverty has been a fundamental constraint on development. Whether Ethiopia can stabilize, address the unresolved political conflicts that the Tigray war suppressed rather than resolved, and build on its economic potential depends on political choices that are genuinely uncertain. The country is large enough and complex enough that its trajectory will shape the Horn of Africa regardless of what direction it takes. The question is whether the stability it has found after years of catastrophe can be converted into something durable.